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Secularization, Religiosity, and the
United States Constitution
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER*
ABSTRACT
This article draws upon leading works in the sociology of religion to assess what I
shall call "the secularization claim" regarding the United States. It endeavors, in par-
ticulai; to clarify the possible meanings of "secularization," and then to use these con -
ceptual refinements to examine what sort of evidence exists that the United States has
been secularized. Though it is not possible tofalsify every version of the secularization
claim, there is little evidence to support it, especially in its most prominent and politi-
cally relevant variations. The article then goes on to offer a preliminary analysis of to
what extent, ifany, are constitutional factors responsible for sustaining a public cul-
ture in the United States that is, by comparison to most other nations, durably reli-
gious. The article identifies four constitutional or quasi-constitutional factors that
sociologists and political scientists have suggested might be partly responsible for the
vigor ofAmerican religion: disestablishment, the fragmentation ofpolitical authority,
ethnic diversity and immigration, and provocativejudicial decisions. The article con-
cludes by recommending that scholars who are interested in the conditions that sustain
religious activity and other forms of civic association in the United States should pay
more attention to the constitutional fragmentation of political authority.
I. THE SECULARIZATION CLAIM
Viewed by comparison to Europe, Canada, or most other nations in the de-
veloped world, the United States is strikingly religious. From the standpoint of
comparative constitutional analysis, the most obvious question to ask about reli-
gious practice in the United States-and, as we shall see, the one that most soci-
ologists have asked-is why the nation remains so robustly religious. Yet,
American politicians, pundits, and legal scholars have worried a great deal
about more or less the opposite question. They have declared that the United
States has become significantly more secular, and they have asked why. More
*University Provost, Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Public Affairs & the University
Center for Human Values, Princeton University; eisgrube@princeton.edu.
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specifically, they have argued about whether the Supreme Court and constitu-
tional law might be partly responsible for the change.
This trend was especially prominent during the 1980s and 1990s, when sev-
eral much-discussed academic critiques of American law and society accused
the Supreme Court of participating in an unjustified but effective campaign to
secularize the United States. For example, in his popular book The Culture of
Disbelief, Stephen Carter contended that "in the public square, religion is too
often trivialized, treated as an unimportant facet of human personality, one easily
discarded, and one with which public-spirited citizens would not bother."'
Carter blamed various causes, including the Supreme Court's transformation
"of the Establishment Clause ... into a guarantor of public secularism" that can
be "used to disable religious groups from active involvement in the programs of
the welfare state, or, for that matter, from active involvement in the public
square that is the crucible of public policy."2 Mary Ann Glendon, in a pair of ar-
ticles coauthored with Raul Yanes, alleged that the Court has "lent its prestige
and sponsorship to a controversial secularizing program" 3 and that the Court
has become a "collaborator, witting or unwitting, of the cultural forces bent on
secularizing America."4 Richard John Neuhaus bemoaned the creation of a
"naked public square," from which religious discourse has been banished, and
he laid some blame upon the Court.' Many of these claims were metaphorical or
ambiguous about the Court's role, but some of its critics were quite blunt. In a
1993 Emory Law Journal article, for example, Professor William Wagner de-
clared that the Supreme Court's "mode of First Amendment interpretation ini-
tiated in 1947" was a "proximate cause" for the "'secularization' of American
culture that has occurred since the Second World War."
6
1. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS
TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION XV (paperback ed. 1994).
2. Id. at 122-23.
3. Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 477, 485
(1991).
4. Raul F Yanes & Mary Ann Glendon, Religion and the Court 1993, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1993
at 28, 30.
5. RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMER-
ICA 26, 80-82,271 n.5 (2d ed. 1986).
6. William J. Wagner, "The Just and the Holy Are One": The Role of Eschatology in Harold Ber-
man's Vision of NormativeJurisprudence, 42 EMORY L. J. 1045, 1047-48 (1993) (reviewing HAROLD J.
BERMAN, FAITH AND ORDER: THE RECONCILIATION OF LAW AND RELIGION (1993)).
446
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Claims of this kind have subsided with the advent of the overtly religious
Bush presidency. Remarkably, they have not disappeared.7 Even if they had, the
concerns about secularization expressed by Carter, Glendon, Neuhaus, and
others during the 1980s and 1990s would remain important because they pro-
vide many people with a conceptual frame for understanding more recent devel-
opments. For these observers, the overtly religious character of American
politics today proves not that legal scholars' claims about secularization were
mistaken, but that the United States has changed course (for better or for worse,
depending on one's perspective) and experienced a kind of religious revival. On
this view, the religious characteristics of American culture appear markedly un-
stable, careening from one extreme to another depending upon what the Su-
preme Court decides or who is elected president. The resulting picture of
American public religion has consequences for both normative and descriptive
analysis. From a normative perspective, if ordinary political decisions can swing
the culture from secular to religious or vice-versa, then one might wish to take
these impacts into account when evaluating judicial rulings, congressional poli-
cies, or electoral choices. From a descriptive perspective, the idea that American
culture changes rapidly from religious to secular and back encourages scholars
to explain why American religiosity is unstable rather than why the nation has
been durably religious.
For these reasons, claims that the United States has been "secularized"-or
that it was "secularized" in the 1980s and 1990s-continue to deserve critical
scrutiny. This article draws upon leading works in the sociology of religion to as-
sess what I shall call "the secularization claim"-the claim, propounded by
Carter, Glendon, Neuhaus, and others, that the Supreme Court has helped to
secularize some aspects of American public culture or public discourse. It en-
deavors, in particular, to clarify the possible meanings of "secularization," and
then to use these conceptual refinements to examine what sort of evidence exists
that the United States has been secularized in a way that might have been af-
fected by Supreme Court decisions. Though it is not possible to falsify every ver-
sion of the secularization claim, there is little evidence to support it, especially in
its most prominent and politically relevant variations. The article then goes on to
offer a preliminary analysis of what seems the more important question, once
one puts aside the misleading image of a culture that veers rapidly between reli-
7. See, e.g., Julia Duin, Religion Under a Secular Assault - Commandments Suits Latest Fight,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 13,2005, at Al.
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gious and secular extremes: namely, to what extent, if any, are constitutional fac-
tors responsible for sustaining a public culture in the United States that is, by
comparison to most other nations, durably religious? The article identifies four
constitutional or quasi-constitutional factors that sociologists and political scien-
tists have suggested might be partly responsible for the vigor of American reli-
gion: disestablishment, the fragmentation of political authority, ethnic diversity
and immigration, and provocative judicial decisions. The article concludes by
recommending that scholars who are interested in the conditions that sustain re-
ligious activity and other forms of civic association in the United States should
pay more attention to the constitutional fragmentation of political authority.
II. FOUR MEANINGS OF "SECULARIZATION"
People often use the concept of secularization casually, as if its meaning were
self-evident. The term is, however, ambiguous. Jos6 Casanova, a comparative so-
ciologist of religion, distinguishes among three versions of secularization.' The
"differentiation hypothesis" maintains that religion has ceased to be the single and
pervasive organizing structure for society, and has become (or is becoming) one of
multiple, specialized social subsystems, each of which has its own place in society
and none of which can be said to organize all the rest.9 The "decline hypothesis"
maintains that religious practices are waning: in particular, that people are becom-
ing less inclined to identify themselves as religious or to participate in religious rit-
uals and institutions. The "privatization hypothesis" maintains that religion is
becoming a private affair of diminishing public significance.
Casanova interprets the "privatization hypothesis" as having two branches,
which I will analyze separately." What I shall call the "inner secularization hy-
pothesis" maintains that the content of religious belief is being drained of its dis-
tinctive character, so that there is little difference between religious and secular
belief systems. The "marginalization hypothesis" asserts that religious institutions
and arguments are being excluded from political and social decisionmaking pro-
cesses. We thus have four distinct concepts of secularization: differentiation,
decline, inner secularization, and marginalization. One of them--differentiation-
has undoubtedly occurred in the United States. The evolution of American higher
8. Jos9 CASANOVA, PUBLIC RELIGIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD 19-20 (1994).
9. Id. at 19, 20-25. Seealso KENNETH D. WALD, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES 4
(4th ed., Rowman & Littlefield Publishers 2003).
10. See CASANOVA, Supia note 8, at 35-36.
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education is illustrative. Religion and higher education were once highly inter-
connected in the United States; they now function as distinct social systems. Writ-
ing in 1968, Christopher Jencks and David Riesman observed that "while the
Protestant clergy dominated American higher education from the founding to
the end of the Civil War, their role has diminished steadily since then and is today
hardly consequential for the system as a whole."" It would, however, be eccentric
to attribute developments of this kind to the courts or, for that matter, to any dis-
tinctive feature of the American constitutional system. Indeed, Casanova de-
scribes differentiation as "a ... trend that serves to define the very structure of
modernity."12 Even critics such as Carter and Neuhaus seem to recognize that re-
ligion's role in modern society is limited by the functional boundaries that differ-
entiate social systems. 3 When these critics complain about secularization, they
must have in mind something other than differentiation: they must have in mind
some version of decline, inner secularization, or marginalization. The next three
sections of this paper examine whether there is evidence that any of these forms of
secularization have occurred in the United States.
III. HAVE RATES OF RELIGIOSITY DECLINED?
At first glance, there seems to be little evidence that religious belief has de-
clined in the United States. "Over the past fifty years of research, the percentage
of Americans who believe in God has never dropped below 90%." '' l According
to 1998 Gallup Poll results, 69 percent of Americans regard themselves as mem-
bers of a church or synagogue; 15 40 percent reported that they had attended
11. CHRISTOPHER JENCKS & DAVID RIESMAN, THE ACADEMIC REVOLUTION 312 (1968); see also
GEORGE MARSDEN, THE SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY: FROM PROTESTANT ESTABLISHMENT
TO ESTABLISHED NONBELIEF 3-5,265 (1994).
12. CASANOVA,supra note 8, at 39, 212-213.
13. Carter says that his chief concern is that "[iln holding, as ve must, that religion is part of the
purely private arena that the state must never disrupt, we run the risk of disabling the religiously
devout from working seriously in the realm of policy." CARTER, supra note 1, at 21 (emphasis
added). Neuhaus says that "[cirucial to ... a democratic order is a public square in which there are
many actors .... The several actors in the public square-government, corporations, education,
communications, religion-are there to challenge, check, and compete with one another."
NEUHAUS, supra note 5, at 84.
14. GEORGE GALLUP, JR. & D. MICHAEL LINDSAY, SURVEYING THE RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE: TRENDS
IN U.S. BELIEFS 23 (1999).
15. Id. at 13
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church within the past week; 6 and 65 percent believed that "religion can answer
all or most of today's problems."' 17 In response to a 1996 Gallup Poll, 47 percent
of Americans said that they read the Bible at least once a week; almost half of
that group (21 percent of all Americans) said that they read the Bible at least once
a day.'" A 1993 poll revealed that 95 percent of Americans said that they prayed
"to a supreme being,"' 9 and 75 percent of Americans said that they prayed at
least once a day.20 In general, these numbers remained relatively steady (or in-
creased) from the 1960s to the 1990s. 2' As Robert Putnam says, "Imleasured by
the yardstick of personal beliefs, Americans' religious commitment has been
reasonably stable over the last half-century-certainly much more so than one
might assume from some public commentary about the secularization of Ameri-
can life.
22
Nevertheless, the numbers are down from peaks in the fifteen years follow-
ing World War II. For example, Gallup results indicated that 76 percent of
Americans claimed to be church members in 1946; the number was 73 percent in
1937 and has hovered around 69 percent since 1980.23 According to Gallup, in
1958, 49 percent of poll respondents claimed that they had attended church
within the past week. That rate is the high-water mark; since 1972, the number
has remained level at around 40 percent.2 4 Moreover, while poll results paint a
picture of durable religious commitment in the United States, they may be mis-
leading. In an often-cited study, C. Kirk Hadaway, Penny Long Marler, and
Mark Chaves compared poll results about church attendance to actual atten-
dance counts. -2 5 Hadaway and his coauthors estimate that "the church-
attendance rate is probably one-half what everyone thinks it is." 26 Of course, if
we are interested in whether religion has declined in the United States, the rele-
16. Id. at 15
17. Id. at 20.
18. See id. at 50.
19. Id. at 46.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 7-20.
22. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN COMMU-
NITY 69 (2000).
23. GALLUP & LINDSAY, sUpra note 14, at 13.
24. Id. at 15; see also ANDREW GREELEY, RELIGIOUS CHANGE IN AMERICA 42-43 (1989).
25. C. Kirk Hadaway, Penny Long Marler & Mark Chaves, What the Polls Don't Show:A Closer
Lookat U.S. Church Attendance, 58 AM. Soc. REV. 741-52 (1993). The key question is whether "the
rate of overreporting is actually higher today" than it was in the past. Id. at 741.
26. Id. at 750.
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vant question is not whether people overreport church attendance, but whether
the rate of overreporting has changed. Hadaway, Long, and Chaves conjecture
that overreporting has increased, but there is no way to test that hypothesis.
27
Leading scholars disagree about trends in American church attendance.
Andrew Greeley argues that "[wjith the exception of the dramatic Catholic
change between 1968 and 1975 (an episodic event), patterns of American church
attendance are remarkably stable. ' 28 Robert Putnam, looking at more or less the
same data, argues that there has been "a decline in church attendance of roughly
one-third between the late 1950s and the late 1990s, with more than half of the
total decline occurring in the 1960s." 29 Roger Finke and Rodney Stark, relying
on church-membership estimates rather than on poll data, argue that religious
participation in the United States has risen steadily throughout American his-
tory.3" Finke and Stark are interested in how many Americans are church par-
ticipants, not in how many attend church each week.
Church attendance is not the only measure of religious belief, and some
commentators claim to have found significant evidence for the decline of reli-
gion in other statistical indicators. For example, an increasing number of
American poll respondents have indicated that they had "no religion." The per-
centage roughly doubled, from around 3 percent to around 6 percent, between
1965 and 1975." 1 Norval Glenn has argued that the increase in "no religion" re-
sponses might result from a general decline in levels of American religiosity-
that is, Americans in general (not just those who report "no religion") might
have experienced diminishing attachments to religion, with the consequence
that a growing number of Americans felt no attachment at all.32
Unambiguous evidence of decline can be found if we focus on particular
groups within American society, rather than on the society as a whole. University
graduates have become notably less religious than they once were. In the 1950s,
"studies generally showed that college educated persons were somewhat more
27. Id. at 749-50. Putnam's book contains an excellent discussion of the controversial statistical
evidence suggesting a decline in levels of church involvement among Americans. PUTNAM, Supra
note 22, at 65-79.
28. GREELEY, supra note 24, at 56.
29. PUTNAM, supra note 22, at 72.
30. ROGER FINKE & RODNEY STARK, THE CHURCHING OF AMERICA, 1776-1990: WINNERS AND
LOSERS IN OUR RELIGIOUS ECONOMY 274 (2005).
31. NORVAL D. GLENN, The Trend in "No Religion" Respondents to U.S. National Surveys, Late
1950s to Early 1980s, 51 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 293 (1987).
32. Id. at 300, 311 (emphasis in the original).
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likely than the less educated to participate in organized religion."33 By the 1970s,
Americans with higher education were less religious than other Americans, and
the trend toward secularism among the educated continued in the 1980s. 34 During
the same period, the proportion of Americans with higher education increased
dramatically; the result, in Robert Wuthnow's words, was that "education seemed
to have become associated with a kind of 'gap' in religious commitment that had
not been there prior to the 1960s."15 On the other hand, some forms of religiosity-
notably, evangelical protestantism-have made gains among the college educated
while other forms-such as mainline protestantism-have diminished; thus, one
kind of gap between college-educated Americans and other Americans has actu-
ally narrowed over the past several decades.36
IV. EVIDENCE OF "INNER SECULARIZATION"
For our purposes, the two versions of privatization-that is, inner seculariza-
tion and marginalization-are probably the most important forms of "seculariza-
tion." Most sociologists who insist that America is becoming more secular are
interested, in the words of Steve Bruce, "not so much [in] 'Do people claim to be
religious' but 'What difference does being religious make."'3 7 Likewise, Carter,
Glendon, Neuhaus, and others who complain about the "secularization" of
American society never deny, so far as I can tell, that most Americans believe in
God or that a majority attend church regularly. Instead, they contend that religion
is not taken sufficiently seriously: that it is "trivialized" or "made into a hobby," as
Carter says, or that it is excluded from "the public square," as Neuhaus says.
Unfortunately, "privatization" is hard to measure. That is especially so inso-
far as we are interested in inner secularization. Statistics leave enormous room
for argument. For example, during the past four decades the number of Ameri-
cans who said that they regarded the Bible as literally true has been cut in half; it
was 65 percent in 1964 compared to 33 percent in 1998.3" Some sociologists take
33. ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE RESTRUCTURING OF AMERICAN RELIGION: SOCIETY AND FAITH SINCE
WORLD WAR II, at 161 (1988).
34. Id. at 162, 170.
35. Id. at 170.
36. Laurie Goodstein & David D. Kirkpatrick, On a Christian Mission to the Top, N.Y. TIMES,
May 22, 2005, at § 1, at 1.
37. STEVE BRUCE, RELIGION IN THE MODERN WORLD 140 (1996).
38. Id. at 144; GALLUP & LINDSAY, supra note 14, at 35.
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this change to be dramatic evidence of secularization,3 ') but Greeley hypothesizes
that it can be explained as the consequence of changes in Catholic theology con-
nected to Vatican 11.40
Bruce makes much of poll data about attitudes of evangelical Christian
youth. In 1951, 77 percent of these young people said that playing cards was
"morally wrong all the time," 91 percent of them felt that way about waltzing, 46
percent about "attending 'Hollywood-type' movies," and 98 percent about
drinking alcohol. By 1982, none (zero percent) of the youth said that playing
cards or waltzing or attending 'Hollywood-type' movies was "morally wrong all
the time"; only 17 percent took that position about drinking alcohol. Indeed, in
1982, 55 percent of evangelical youth thought that "heavy petting" was occasion-
ally permissible in dating relationships-a statistic for which no 1950s compari-
son is possible, because (according to Bruce) it would have been unthinkable that
any evangelical Christian would condone such behavior and hence pollsters did
not ask.41
Bruce suggests that these changes show that "evangelicals have abandoned
a lot of their social distinctiveness '42 and have thus become more secular. Per-
haps so, but another interpretation is possible: rather than supposing that evan-
gelical Christians have assimilated into the American mainstream, we might
suppose that evangelicals remain equally far removed from the "mainstream,"
but that the "mainstream" itself has shifted. Card playing (to say nothing of
waltzing!) is no longer a focus of intense moral concern. Indeed, Robert Putnam
cites the decline of neighborhood card games as one indication that American
civil society has weakened.43
Statistics aside, there is a body of more impressionistic research suggesting
that modern American religious belief is sometimes shallow or self-centered or
both. Thus Robert Bellah and his research team called attention to one of their
interview subjects who "actually named her religion (she calls it her 'faith') after
herself." According to "Sheila Larson" (a pseudonym devised by the Bellah
team), her faith was "my own Sheilaism"; it was "just my own little voice" which
urged her to, among other things, "love yourself and be gentle with yourself."
39. See, e.g., BRUCE, supra note 37, at 138; GLENN, supra note 31, at 311.
40. GREELEY, supra note 24, at 18-19.
41. BRUCE, supra note 37, at 148-49. The data is from JAMES DAVISON HUNTER, EVANGELICALISM:
THE COMING GENERATION 59 (1987).
42. BRUCE, supra note 37, at 149.
43. PUTNAM, SUpra note 22, at 102-05.
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Bellah and his coauthors believe that Sheilaism "suggests the logical possibility
of over 220 million American religions, one for each of us," making American
religion "private and diverse" where it was once "public and unified."44
Critics of the "inner secularization" hypothesis allege that it exaggerates
both the shallowness of modern-day American religion and the profundity of its
antecedents.15 Greeley contends that the "inner secularization" hypothesis de-
pends upon a dichotomy which holds that "either American religion is authen-
tic, prophetic, and challenging or it is inauthentic, culture-supporting, and
comforting."46 The dichotomy is a false one: today and throughout American
history, "both dimensions of religion [willi almost certainly coexist both in their
pure forms and in many admixtures of the two."4 7 Greeley and political scientist
Kenneth Wald emphasize two careful ethnographic analyses of Muncie, Indi-
ana, done fifty years apart: the famous "Middletown" study of Muncie, Indiana,
published by Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd in 1929, and a follow-up
study in the 1970s.48 The follow-up study found that there had been some
"growth of religious tolerance, but little else had changed since the 1920s.""4
Moreover, Roger Finke and Rodney Stark present compelling evidence that
throughout American history-including recent decades-the most demand-
ing religions have grown in size while less demanding, more secularized
churches have lost membership.
5 0
Yet, as Greeley concedes (with obvious dissatisfaction), the "inner secular-
ization" hypothesis "cannot be falsified.""' By the same token, it cannot be veri-
fied. It is hard to measure the strength of "inner beliefs," and is still more
difficult to compare such beliefs across generations. We must therefore concede
that "inner secularization" might have occurred in the United States. If "inner
secularization" has taken place, it is possible to devise theories that attribute
some responsibility for the phenomenon to the Supreme Court. So, for example,
44. ROBERT N. BELLAH ET AL., HABITS OF THE HEART: INDIVIDUALISM AND COMMITMENT IN
AMERICAN LIFE 220-21 (1996); see also, e.g., WADE CLARK ROOF, SPIRITUAL MARKETPLACE: BABY
BOOMERS AND THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN RELIGION (1999).
45. WALD, supra note 9, at 10-17; GREELEY,SUpr note 24, at 117-21.
46. GREELEY, SUpra note 24, at 119.
47. Id.
48. Seegenerally THEODORE CAPLOW ET AL., ALL FAITHFUL PEOPLE: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN
MIDDLETOWN'S RELIGION (1983).
49. WALD, SUpra note 9, at 13.
50. See FINKE & STARK, supra note 30, at 42-43, 238,249-255, 275.
51. GREELEY, SUpra note 24, at 119.
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Bellah's account of "inner secularization" connects it with the rise of rights-
oriented individualism in the United States, 52 and one might in turn blame the
Supreme Court's doctrine or rhetoric for stoking America's enthusiasm for
rights.
This sort of causal story is untestable. The best we can do is to notice two
features of the "inner secularization" hypothesis which cast doubt upon claims
that Supreme Court decisions, or any other recent constitutional choices, are
root causes. The first pertains to the timing of the phenomenon. Complaints
about the shallowness of American religion are nothing new. For example, in
Will Herberg's 1955 classic, Protestant-Catholic-Jew: An Essay in American Reli-
gious Sociology, the author laments that "the religiousness characteristic of
America today is very often a religiousness without religion, a religiousness with
almost any kind of content or none, a way of sociability or 'belonging' rather
than a way of reorienting life. ' '53 Perhaps Herberg was wrong, or perhaps the
"inner secularization" phenomenon has grown increasingly acute. But if "inner
secularization" dates back to 1955 (or before), it would be implausible to assign a
significant causal role to the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause doctrine
(which was launched in 1947) or even to its individual rights jurisprudence in
general (which was then in its infancy).
Timing aside, the "inner secularization" hypothesis was formulated within
sociological theory by Thomas Luckmann and others to describe the effects of
modernization (not of particular court decisions or constitutional choices) in any
society (not just the United States). In particular, Luckmann believed that "inner
secularization" was a consequence of social differentiation: once religion became
one sphere among many others, religion necessarily was reduced to one of many
roles assumed by the autonomous self. 4 If "inner secularization" is an inevitable
consequence of modernity, then, obviously, it will not be much affected by Su-
preme Court jurisprudence-or, for that matter, by any other mainstream po-
litical choices. Of course, Luckmann might be wrong. But, at a minimum, his
theory provides an alternative explanation for "inner secularization," one that is
consistent with the trajectory of religious belief in Europe and Canada, as well as
in the United States.
52. BELLAH ET AL., supr-a note 44, at 143-44.
53. WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-CATHOLIC-JEw: AN ESSAY IN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS SOCIOLOGY
260 (1960).
54. CASANOVA, supra note 8, at 35-37. For Luckmann's seminal book, see generally THOMAS
LUCKMANN, THE INVISIBLE RELIGION: THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION IN MODERN SOCIETY (1967).
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER
V. THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL POWER OF AMERICAN RELIGION
That brings us, finally, to the marginalization hypothesis: the claim that
even if it has not declined numerically and regardless of whether it has under-
gone "inner secularization," American religion has been excluded from social
and political decisionmaking processes. When commentators contend that the
Supreme Court has somehow "secularized" American politics, they often seem
to have "marginalization" in mind. That is certainly what worried Neuhaus
when he inveighed against the "naked public square." He has written, for ex-
ample, that American churches are in danger of losing their role as mediating
institutions between state and society: "Once religion is reduced to nothing more
than privatized conscience, the public square has only two actors in it-the state
and the individual. 55 The "marginalization hypothesis" is also prominent in
Carter's argument.
Despite its popularity, there is surprisingly little evidence to support the
"marginalization hypothesis." Indeed, most of the evidence seems to run in the
opposite direction: it suggests that religion is becoming an increasingly powerful
force in American politics. Of particular importance is the spectacular growth of
what Robert Wuthnow calls "religious special purpose groups."56 Like churches,
these interest groups are rooted in religious concerns; unlike churches, they are
"loIrganized to accomplish explicitly focused objectives" and so "do not have to
concern themselves with building churches, with running seminaries, or with
rendering doctrinal interpretations. 5 7 Examples include the Fellowship of
Christian Athletes, the Moral Majority, the Coalition on Women and Religion,
the National Council of Churches, and Friends in Service Here (FISH). Reli-
gious special purpose groups may draw their membership entirely from one de-
nomination, but, as the above examples suggest, many (if not most) are
interdenominational. Religious special purpose groups have long existed in the
United States (the Women's Christian Temperance Union, founded in 1874, is a
notable nineteenth-century example), but Wuthnow reports that their number
and influence escalated dramatically after World War II. He estimates that ap-
proximately 400 such groups existed at the war's end, that almost 200 new
55. NEUHAUS, supra note 5, at 82.
56. WUTHNOW, supra note 33, at 100-31; ROBERT WUTHNOW, THE STRUGGLE FOR AMERICA'S
SOUL: EVANGELICALS, LIBERALS, AND SECULARISM 51-54 (1989).
57. WUTHNOW,SUpra note 56, at 51-52.
456
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groups had come into being by 1960, and that by the 1980s America was home to
around 900 religious special purpose groups (including some very prominent
ones, such as the Moral Majority).5  In Wuthnow's view, the rise of religious spe-
cial purpose groups has enabled "religious people Itol become organized to par-
ticipate in public affairs more effectively. '59 As a result, "religion's influence may
have been increasing. At least religious groups are making more collective ef-
forts now to influence the public sphere than they did only a few decades ago."''
Even if we put aside the rapid growth of religious interest groups, there re-
mains plenty of evidence that religion's role in American public life is central
rather than marginal. Religious participation correlates positively with virtually
all forms of political and civic involvement, including voting. 6' If we index pub-
lic power by reference to money rather than participation, religious organiza-
tions still look robust. Partly in consequence of their tax-exempt status, religious
organizations receive and disburse large sums each year. Kenneth Wald has re-
ported that:
In 1986, for example, Americans contributed more than $40 bil-
lion to religious institutions, making churches by far the most fa-
vored recipient of philanthropy. Congregations devoted a
significant share of that income to education, human service,
health and hospitals, community development, the arts, and envi-
ronmental protection.... With its $1.5 billion annual budget,
Catholic Charities is second only to the U.S. government in wel-
fare activities. 2
Churches and other religious organizations compete effectively for public as
well as private contributions. Despite Establishment Clause restrictions, reli-
gious institutions were major beneficiaries of federal spending long before
"charitable choice" became a political issue. Stephen Monsma reports that in
1993, "65 percent of Catholic Charities' revenues came from government
sources, as did 75 percent of the Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services
58. WUTHNOW, supra note 33, at 112.
59. WurHNow, supra note 56, at 51.
60. Id. at 54.
61. WALD, supra note 9, at 35-37; PUTNAM, supra note 22, at 67.
62. WALD,supra note 9, at 10.
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revenues, and 92 percent of Lutheran Social Ministries' revenues."63 Among pri-
vate colleges and universities, "religiously based institutions ten[d] to report re-
ceiving a slightly greater proportion of their funds from government sources
than did the secularly based institutions."64 Monsma concludes that "religiously
based nonprofits fully share in the public-nonprofit partnership. '6 5 There is a
single notable exception to this rule: only limited public money goes to religious
elementary schools, junior high schools, and high schools.66 Religious schools ap-
pear, however, to have flourished even without subsidies. For example, accord-
ing to Robert Wuthnow, Christian schools grew between 1971 and 1978 at rates
that were "phenomenal: a 47 percent increase in numbers of schools, a 113 per-
cent increase in numbers of teachers, and a 95 percent increase in enrollments."
67
(Wuthnow published these claims in 1989, when the secularization claim was
near the zenith of its popularity).
Religion's power is evident from, among other things, the deference paid to
it by politicians. In recent presidential elections, candidates from both parties
have sought to demonstrate their piety.68 George W. Bush has emphasized the
importance of religion to his personal philosophy and public office, creating
what one journalist has labeled "the faith-based presidency. ' 69 More than four
decades ago, the sociologist Will Herberg commented that "a professed 'unbe-
liever' would be anathema to either of the big parties and would have no chance
whatever in political life."'7 The remark rings no less true today; indeed, in the
2000 presidential election, Democratic vice-presidential candidate Joseph
Lieberman declared that "our Constitution was made only for a moral and reli-
gious people" and that we should "never... indulge the supposition 'that moral-
ity can be maintained without religion.""'7 Lieberman's remarks provoked a
modest backlash (most notably from Jewish groups), and he eventually hedged
63. STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZA-
TIONS AND PUBLIC MONEY 1 (1996).
64. Id. at 69.
65. Id. at 70.
66. Id. at 10.
67. WUTHNOW, supra note 33, at 198. "Eighty-six percent of all students enrolled in private ele-
mentary and secondary schools are in religiously based schools." MONSMA, Supra note 63, at 9.
68. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Battle Cry of Faithful Pits Believers Against Unbelievers, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2004, at 24.
69. Ron Suskind, Without a Doubt, N.Y. TIMES MAC., Oct. 17,2004, at 44, 47.
70. HERBERG, Supra note 53, at 52.
71. Richard P&ez-Pefia, Lieberman Seeks Greater Role for Religion in Public Life, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 28, 2000, at A14.
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his views, but it is not clear that he paid any political price whatsoever for slan-
dering nonbelievers.
The statistical and other evidence of religion's social and political power in
the United States seems so overwhelming that it is hard to imagine what basis
there could be for worrying that religion has been "marginalized." Perhaps
someone could point to changes in the way that social services are delivered.
Robert Wuthnow suggests that over the last century "the state has taken over
many of the welfare and educational functions formerly provided by religious
organizations."'72 Does this development constitute evidence of marginaliza-
tion? It might instead be characterized as an instance of differentiation: In a
modern society, religion cannot expect to dominate such distinct spheres as edu-
cation, welfare services, or health care. Moreover, while the welfare state's
growth is obvious, religious institutions continue to be important providers of
social services in the United States. According to Stephen Monsma, for example,
"]almong all child care providers, one-third are church-based.... Among the
agencies belonging to the National Association of Homes and Services to Chil-
dren, roughly one-half have a clear religious base."
73
Religious special purpose groups have augmented religion's role as a pro-
vider of social services much as they have increased religion's influence in poli-
tics. Faith-based service organizations now provide far more social services than
do traditional congregations.74 Nevertheless, congregations also continue to de-
liver services. Mark Chaves, who has authored the leading scholarly study of
modern American congregations, suggests that "the history of congregational
involvement in social services [in the United States] is characterized more by
continuity than change." 75 Chaves allows that a "smaller percentage of [charitable]
work" is now being done "by congregations and other religious organizations,"
but he argues that the government has not taken over work previously per-
formed by religious institutions; rather, "government and government-funded
organizations began new activities, with the result that much more antipoverty
work [is being] accomplished. 76
72. WUTHNOw,supra note 56, at 108.
73. MONSMA, SUpra note 63, at 9.
74. MARK CHAVES, CONGREGATIONS IN AMERICA 44-93 (2004); ROBERT WUTHNOW, SAVING
AMERICA: FAITH-BASED SERVICES AND THE FUTURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY 172 (2004).
75. CHAVES, SUpra note 74, at 87.
76. Id. at 86-87.
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Of course, even if religion remains a (perhaps increasingly) powerful social
and political force, it may have been unfairly excluded from some government
benefits. One can always argue (by reference to equality or some other principle)
that the Supreme Court has enforced the Establishment Clause too rigidly. That
is what Carter does, for example, when he complains that the Court has exag-
gerated Establishment Clause restrictions and thereby "disableldi religious
groups from active involvement in the programs of the welfare state." But
Carter goes on to allege that the Supreme Court has also disabled religious
groups "from active involvement in the public square that is the crucible of pub-
lic policy." 77 This further allegation lacks support. From the evidence we have
reviewed, it would appear that American-style disestablishment has permitted
religious belief and religious organizations to flourish, and that they have been
able to participate powerfully in public life. There is room for doubt, of course;
in general, it is impossible to offer conclusive judgments about the kind of socio-
logical issues addressed here. Still, if some religions and churches have (at some
times) refrained from entering public political discourse, it seems more plausible
to say, with Casanova, that they "voluntarily withdrew and stayed out of it for
religious reasons 78 than to say that they were disabled by Supreme Court action.
VI. ASSESSING THE SECULARIZATION CLAIM
We have now surveyed the various ways in which America might have be-
come more secular. Does the evidence provide any reason to believe that the Su-
preme Court has secularized the United States? If so, the effects are difficult to
detect. "Secularization" in the sense of "differentiation" has certainly occurred
in the United States. Domains such as higher education, once subject to religious
control, have developed autonomous, nonreligious norms. Yet, the timing of
these events makes it impossible to attribute causation to the Court, and even the
Court's critics seem prepared to concede that "differentiation" is an essential fea-
ture of a modern, pluralist society. Meanwhile, the evidence for "decline," "inner
secularization," and "marginalization" is ambiguous at best. Statistics suggest
that church-going and other religious practices have remained vigorous and
stable; ethnographic studies indicate that Americans today may be no less pious
77. CARTER, supra note 1, at 123.
78. CASANOVA,supra note 8, at 164.
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than their predecessors; and religious organizations exercise tremendous politi-
cal and social clout.
There is room for argument, however. Religious belief has declined notice-
ably in some important sectors of American society-most notably, among the
college educated. There is statistical evidence that the level of irreligion in the
United States (as measured by the fraction of Americans who say they never
attend church) is rising. Claims about "inner secularization" are ultimately im-
possible to falsify or verify, and some respected sociologists insist that the phe-
nomenon is real. Finally, it is possible to restate claims about "marginalization"
in a nonfalsifiable form (not easily though-the evidence of religion's power and
public presence is hard to deny).
If indeed secularization has occurred in the United States, it is possible-at
least as a purely theoretical matter-to describe causal mechanisms through
which Supreme Court decisions might have made America more secular. For
example, one might claim that if the Supreme Court had not prohibited states
from subsidizing religious schools, private religious schools would be (even)
more numerous than they are today, and as a result religious communities
would be stronger. Or that if the Supreme Court had not eliminated public
school prayer, students would have become more devout. Or that the Supreme
Court's focus on rights has exacerbated the individualism of American society
and hence contributed to the "inner secularization" of American religion.
On the other hand, there are plenty of other possible-and, in my view,
much more plausible-causes for whatever secularization has occurred in the
United States. Robert Putnam blames television, commuting, suburban sprawl,
the two-career family, and what he calls "generational shift" for the diminution
in American civic activity (including church-going). 9 Andrew Greeley points to
changes in sexual morality to explain the drop in Catholic church-going.8"
Robert Wuthnow attributes changes in American religious culture to, among
other things, dramatic increases in the proportion of Americans receiving col-
lege education.8 These social forces (and others, including the cultural shifts
brought about by wars, the feminist movement, the civil rights movement, and
changing demographic patterns) seem more plausible sources of American reli-
gious change than do Supreme Court decisions.
79. PUTNAM, supra note 22, at 283-84.
80. GREELEY, supra note 24, at 47-56.
81. WUTHNOW, Supra note 33, at 154-72.
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So why is the secularization claim so popular? William P. Marshall has iden-
tified a few possibilities. First, claims about secularization might be motivated
by disagreement with the details of judicial doctrine or political argument. They
might, in other words, be complaints about what judges or other political actors
have said about American society, rather than about American society itself.8 2
Second, there might be what Marshall terms a "political" explanation for the
secularization claim: because America is religious, complaining about "secular-
ization" is an effective rhetorical trope. Marshall suggests that "Irieligiously ori-
ented political groups and movements.. . have been active in spreading the
marginalization message for their own political benefit."83 A related, but slightly
different, explanation focuses on perception rather than political strategy.
People who believe that religion is exceedingly important may be inclined to
worry that others do not take religion sufficiently seriously and that matters are
getting worse. Ironically, then, the persistent hand-wringing about "seculariza-
tion" may itself be evidence of American religion's durable social and political
strength.
VII. AMERICAN RELIGION IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
The concern with secularization has distracted constitutional theorists from
studying another, potentially more productive, question: Are constitutional fea-
tures of the American regime (including not only Supreme Court decisions but
also structural elements of the constitutional design) in any way responsible for the
absence of secularization in America? After all, comparative studies consistently
suggest that the American political regime is notably hospitable to religious belief.
Poll data again provide a useful, if imperfect, starting point. A 1995 poll found that
only 70 percent of Canadians and 61 percent of Britons (by comparison to 96 per-
cent of Americans) believed "in God or [a] universal spirit or lifeforce."84 A 1993
Gallup poll found that only 59 percent of Britons (as compared to 88 percent of
Americans) said they "ever pray."85 Similar differences persist in questions that
pertain to intensity of belief. For example, "among people in the United Kingdom
just 17 percent of adults say they consider religion 'very important' in their lives[;
82. William P. Marshall, The Culture of Belief and the Politics of Religion, 63 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 453, 460-61 (2000).
83. Id. at 461.
84. GALLUP & LINDSAY, supra note 14, at 122.
85. Id. at 123.
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bly comparison,... 57 percent of Americans take it very seriously. '8 6 If we turn to
evidence of irreligiosity, we find even more striking evidence of Europe's compar-
ative secularism. For example, 59 percent of French poll respondents have said
that they never go to church; during the last three decades this number has never
exceeded 19 percent in the United States. Similar disparities exist between the
United States and other European countries.87
More qualitative studies of religious belief produce results consistent with
these questions about frequency of church attendance. For example, polls con-
ducted in the United States in 1994 and in Canada in 1995 asked respondents
how they viewed the Bible: as "the actual word of God ... to be taken literally,"
as "the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally,"
or as "an ancient book of fables, legends, history, and moral precepts." In both
countries, the middle option ("inspired word of God") was the most popular,
and it was selected by more or less the same number of respondents-57 percent
of Americans and 53 percent of Canadians. But the remainder of the popula-
tions divided very differently. 31 percent of Americans, but only 14 percent of
Canadians, regarded the Bible as the literal word of God. And, conversely, 28
percent of Canadians, but only I I percent of Americans, said that the Bible was
"an ancient of book of fables," history, and morals. 88
Nor are the differences confined to opinion poll data:
In the United States, the number of Bibles purchased annually per
capita is more than double that in Great Britain, nearly five times
as high as in West Germany, and eleven times the number in
France. In the United States, one church exists for approximately
every 500 people, whereas in each of the other three countries one
church exists for only every 1,000 members of the population.
Clergy per capita in the United States exceeds that in Great Brit-
86. Id. at 122.
87. SHEENA ASHFORD & NOEL TIMMS, WHAT EUROPE THINKS: A STUDY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN
VALUES 46 (1992).
88. GALLUP & LINDSAY, supra note 14, at 121. Contrasts between American and Western Euro-
pean data exhibit similar patterns. See Peter L. Berger, The Desecularization of the World: A Global
Overview, in THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION AND WORLD POLITICS 1,
9-10 (Peter L. Berger, ed., 1999) (emphasis in original); Grace Davie, Europe: The Exception that
Proves the Rule?, in THE DESCULARIZATION OF THE WORLD, supra, at 65-84; CASANOVA, supra note 8,
at 75-91; STEVE BRUCE, CHOICE AND RELIGION: A CRITIQUE OF RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY 89-120
(1999).
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ain and West Germany by a ratio of two to one (and is marginally
higher than in France).89
If we focus on rates of secularization, rather than levels of secularization, we
get similar results. For example, in Western Europe, "there has been an increase
in key indicators of secularization, both on the level of expressed belief (espe-
cially those that could be called orthodox in Protestant or Catholic terms) and,
dramatically, on the level of church-related behavior-attendance at services of
worship, adherence to church-dictated codes of personal behavior . . ., recruit-
ment to the clergy."9 These trends have long been "observed in the northern
countries of the continent" and since World War II they have "rapidly engulfed
the south."'" To these statistical results we may add Jos6 Casanova's observation
that "among advanced Western industrial societies only in the United States has
there appeared a religious fundamentalist movement of societal importance."
9 2
In light of this evidence, it is not surprising that sociologists compete to explain
why American religion is so vigorous (especially by comparison to its European
counterparts), rather than to identify forces tending to make America more secu-
lar. If we are interested in how the Constitution influences American religious
practice, we would do well to invert the question most commonly asked in Ameri-
can law journals: Instead of asking whether the Supreme Court has secularized the
United States, we should ask whether constitutional features of the United States
have inhibited secularization. The next section summarizes some leading sociolog-
ical theories; all of them have a constitutional or quasi-constitutional dimension.
VIII. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF RELIGIOUS VIGOR
A. Disestablishment
According to Casanova, "the United States represents the paradigmatic and
historically first model of the separation of church and state."93 Although ordi-
89. WUTHNOW,supra note 56, at 50.
90. Berger, supra note 87, at 9-10.
91. Id. at 10. For further discussion of continental European examples, see, e.g., Davie, supra
note 87, at 65-84; CASANOVA, supra note 8, at 75-91; BRUCE, supra note 87, at 89-99. On Britain in
particular, see BRUCE,supra note 37, at 29-37; BRUCE, supra note 87, at 61-88; STEVE BRUCE, RELI-
GION IN MODERN BRITAIN 29-71 (1995).
92. CASANOVA, supra note 8, at 135.
93. Id. at 71.
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nary citizens and even law professors sometimes worry about whether disestab-
lishment hinders religion, sociologists usually suppose that American-style
disestablishment contributes to religious vitality. Alexis de Tocqueville famously
emphasized that if religion affiliated itself with the state, its power and prestige
would suffer from association with policies that were unsuccessful or transi-
tory.94 Roger Finke and Rodney Stark are among the most sophisticated modern
exponents of the position. They amplify Tocqueville's case in terms drawn from
rational choice theory. Finke and Stark maintain that a free market in religion
permits suppliers to generate and market the religious "product" that will most
satisfy the needs of consumers.95 Established churches are "monopolists" and
therefore exhibit two predictable deficiencies. First, "a single faith cannot shape
its appeal to suit precisely the needs of one market segment without sacrificing
its appeal to another." ' More specifically, no single church can be "at once
worldly and otherworldly, strict and permissive, exclusive and inclusive, while
the market will also contain distinct consumer segments with strong preferences
on each of these aspects of faith."97 Religious pluralism can therefore satisfy a
larger portion of the population than can religious establishment.9" Second,
"[Mionopoly firms always tend to be lazy."99 When a religious organization de-
pends upon support from the government, its leaders have an incentive to please
politicians and bureaucrats rather than to cultivate the religion's membership.
100
For that reason, some religious leaders have worried that President George W.
Bush's faith-based initiatives, which would provide state support to religious
service providers, will damage American religious institutions.
10 1
B. Fragmentation of Government Power
Finke and Stark tend to assume that people turn to religious institutions to get
a distinctively religious benefit, such as personal salvation, consolation, or moral
94. ALExIs DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 297-301 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969); see also CASANOVA, supra note 8, at 29, 70.
95. FINKE &STARK, supra note30,at 17-21,252-55.
96. Id. at 19.
97. Id. at 18.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 19.
100. Id. at 19, 39, 59-66; CASANOVA, supra note 8, at 22.
101. Laurie Goodstein, Bush's Charity Plan is Raising Concerns for Religious Right, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 3, 2001, at A1.
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and spiritual guidance. If that were so, then the vitality of religious practice might
depend almost entirely upon whether churches were free to produce and "mar-
ket" the kind of religion that adherents demanded: Disestablishment would cre-
ate a "religious free-market" in which (almost) everybody who wanted religion
could find a faith to his or her liking. But it is easy to imagine other interests that
might lead people to join or abandon churches. For example, people might join
churches in order to obtain social services or acquire political clout.
Several social scientists have accordingly suggested that the comparative
vigor of American religion is partly attributable to the dispersion of political
power in the United States. Government power is shared at the national level
among the two houses of Congress, an independently elected president, more-
or-less independent agencies, and an independent judiciary. Political power "is
further subdivided among at least three separate levels of government (national,
state, and local)." 112 The decentralization of American political power is "rein-
forced by a tradition of popular sovereignty that limits the authority of national
party leaders.' 0. 3 The result is a system with numerous "entry points" and "veto
points": In other words, there are many independent actors with the capacity to
make policy or block its development.
This fragmentation of power has at least two important consequences for re-
ligious institutions. First, insofar as the government's veto points render it un-
likely to supply satisfactory social services (such as hospitals, schools, child care,
and welfare services), people will look to private institutions, including churches,
to fill the void. Second, the complex structure of American government means
that private groups, including churches and religious special purpose groups, will
have multiple opportunities to affect policy. For that reason, as Kenneth Wald
notes, "political scientists have long recognized [that] the complex structure of the
U.S. government encourages groups to undertake political activity.""' If religious
groups can provide needed social services, or if they can effectively lobby the gov-
ernment, people will have additional reasons to affiliate with such groups.
Wald suggests that anti-abortion religious groups were more successful in
the United States than in Canada because of "the many avenues of attack pro-
vided by the complex and multifaceted U.S. system of government."'0 5 By con-
102. WALD,SUpra note 9, at 31.
103. Id.; see also STEVE BRUCE, CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANT POLITICS 158-64 (1998).
104. WALD,supra note 9, at 31.
105. Id. at 32.
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trast, the Canadian parliamentary system "offered the opponents of liberalized
abortion few opportunities to challenge official policy." For example, "the crim-
inal code was the exclusive responsibility of the national government," so "the
provincial authorities and local governments could do little to restrict the avail-
ability of abortion services."'11
6
Wald supplies another example involving more pedestrian issues. He quotes
a Gainesville, Florida, newspaper story about an elderly woman who lost electri-
cal service when a tree fell on her property during a storm. She sought help from
the public utility, the government, and her church. "By the time the public offi-
cials had begun to investigate the situation, the church had sent over volunteers
to repair the damage and to look after the woman until family members could
arrive to help. ' 107
To similar effect, Steve Bruce emphasizes the consequences of local govern-
ment autonomy, which enables religious groups to "recreate at a local level the
degree of cultural homogeneity that is needed to sustain the 'church' form of re-
ligion."'0 8 It matters that "[iun the USA, education is a state and county matter"
so that "Iclultural groups which are strong in particular regions can ensure that
their values are respected."'0 9 Moreover, "[i]n Europe it is very difficult to set up
an independent school; it is very easy in the USA.""0 Finally, "[flederalism en-
courages cultural groups to use elections" because, even if they cannot win at the
national level, they may have considerable clout in local elections."'
Fragmentation is much less popular than disestablishment as an explana-
tion for the vigor of American religion, but it may be an equally important vari-
able. If Finke and Stark or Tocqueville are correct, then what matters most
about disestablishment is that it promotes competition among religions. Estab-
lishment can frustrate competition in at least three ways: directly, by prohibiting
all but the "one true faith"; indirectly, by creating a single church (or set of
churches) which, as a result of their enormous wealth or their political influence,
106. Id. at 32-33; see also id. at 124-38.
107. Id. at 22 n.10.
108. BRUCE, supra note 37, at 142.
109. BRUCE, supra note 102, at 159.
110. BRUCE, supra note 37, at 143. It bears mention that, according to Wuthnow, the growth of
Christian schools between 1971 and 1978 was phenomenal: "a 47 percent increase in numbers of
schools, a 113 percent increase in numbers of teachers, and a 95 percent increase in enrollments."
WUTHNOW, supra note 33, at 198.
111. BRUCE, supra note 102, at 160; see also Richard C. Schragger, The Role of the Local in the Doc-
trine and Discourse of Religious Liberty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1811(2004).
CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER
are uniquely capable of supplying what their members want and so squeeze out
other faiths; or, again indirectly, by providing all churches with an incentive to
serve the state rather than their congregations. Yet, barriers of the first, direct
kind are rare in first-world countries. If only the indirect effects of establishment
matter, and if(as Finke and Stark argue) nonestablished faiths are better able to
serve members than established ones, then the most crucial question is not
whether established churches exist but whether nonestablished churches can or-
ganize and operate effectively when needed. Government fragmentation makes
it easier for new, small churches to have an impact, and hence increases the like-
lihood of religious competition-regardless of whether one or more faiths are
receiving government subsidies.
C. Ethnic Diversity and Immigration
Another explanation for American religiosity focuses on ethnic diversity and
the immigrant character of American society. Two early and influential accounts
of the relationship between ethnic identity and American religious practice were
H. Richard Niebuhr's The Social Sources ofDenominationalism, published in 1929,
and Will Herberg's Protestant-Catholic-Jew, first published in 1955. Herberg ar-
gued that "it is as members of a religious group that the great mass of Americans
identify themselves to establish their social location once they have really sloughed
off their immigrant foreignness."'1 2 Whereas immigrants were expected to give
up their language and embrace many American values, "the religion of the immi-
grants-with certain necessary modifications, such as the replacement of the eth-
nic language by English-was accorded a place in the American scheme of things
that made it at once both genuinely American and a familiar principle of group
identification." ' 1 3 This process of identification is important not only to new im-
migrants but to descendants who want "to recover [their] 'heritage,' so as to give
[themselves] some sort of 'name,' or context of self-identification and social loca-
tion in the larger society.""' 4 "Self-identification in religious terms" promotes in-
stitutional forms of religious activity: "It engenders a sense of adherence to a
church or denomination and impels one to institutional affiliation."
' 5
112. HERBERG, supra note 53, at 38.
113. Id. at31.
114. Id. at 257.
115. Id.
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The details of Herberg's argument are dated, but the general themes remain
powerful. In the United States, religious institutions provide sources of personal
support, political organization, and social community for ethnic minorities, in-
cluding communities of new immigrants. "One reason why Americans are reli-
gious is that their churches offer them a way in which they can display their
commitment to American values while maintaining their ethnic distinctive-
ness." " 6 This phenomenon is not unique to new immigrants; the strength of
African-American churches is a powerful example of how religious institutions
can sustain groups that feel excluded from mainstream American culture and
politics. Conversely, religious affiliations also provide a way for mainstream or
privileged groups to claim prestige: they could exclude outsiders and thereby en-
trench their own social position." 7
D. Provocative Court Decisions
Finally, some sociologists have proposed that controversial Supreme Court
decisions have helped to catalyze the formation of religious special purpose
groups and hence to increase religion's power and presence in political arenas.
Robert Wuthnow points out, for example, that Protestant leaders formed
Americans United for the Separation of Church and State in reaction to Everson
v. Board of Education,"' which upheld the constitutionality of public subsidies
for the bus fares paid by students traveling to and from Catholic schools." 9 Reli-
gious groups organized on both sides of the school prayer issue after Engel v.
Vitale,12 which prohibited states from sponsoring prayers in public schools.' 2 '
Steve Bruce believes that the school prayer decisions helped to reinforce the im-
portance of public prayer to religious Americans; he notes that, in contrast, Brit-
ain has continued to permit prayer in its schools, but the ritual has quietly faded
into irrelevance. 122
The Court's share of responsibility for these developments is not easy to assess
(I am myself skeptical about whether the Court decisions had much independent
116. BRUCE, supra note 37, at 135.
117. See id.
118. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
119. WUTHNOWsupra note 33, at 115.
120. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
121. WUTHNOW, supra note 33, at 115.
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causal significance; I mention them in order to render the sociological literature
more faithfully, not to endorse the hypothesis). Kenneth Wald notes that "Jals is
often the case in political and legal change, the consciousness of the Court was
shaped by intensive grassroots political activity that raised the church-state issue
to a high place on the national agenda."' 123 He reports that "ftlhroughout the era of
judicial activism on the church-state question, the churches, allied groups of lay-
persons, and interfaith organizations functioned much as classic interest
groups--designing legislation, raising public support in well-orchestrated cam-
paigns for public opinion, lobbying legislatures and courts, and bringing and de-
fending lawsuits."' 24 If so, then courts are not in any simple sense the cause of
religious interest-group activity; they are instead part of a feedback loop in which
interest groups beget lawsuits, which in turn beget more interest groups, and so
on. In any event, the details of the Court's position apparently mattered less than
the fact that the Court took a position: Religious interest groups originated in re-
sponse to decisions that upheld legislative discretion (as Everson did) as well as
ones that limited it (as Engel did), and they organized on both sides of these cases.
IX. FRAGMENTATION AND Civic ASSoCIATION
Thus far, we have discussed secularization and religiosity without examin-
ing their relationship to other, nonreligious forms of civic activity and associa-
tion. That focus can be misleading. The ideas and explanations proposed in the
preceding section help to illuminate the structure of American civil society in
general, not just its religious components. In particular, the fragmentation of po-
litical authority under the United States Constitution deserves greater attention
from students of constitutional design, both in the United States and elsewhere.
Fragmentation plays a largely unappreciated role in securing liberty and in
shaping the character of American citizens and American public life. We may
generalize the idea of fragmentation beyond its usage in the last section, so that
it encompasses not only the dispersion of power among numerous political insti-
tutions but also disestablishment and ethnic diversity. Each is a feature of the
American regime that tends to inhibit the rise of a single, dominant social or po-
litical authority. The fragmentation of authority means that there is no bully ca-
pable of smothering its rivals. Put in more affirmative (and I think more
123. WALD,supra note 9, at 111.
124. Id.
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illuminating) terms, fragmentation means there will always be a variety of con-
stituencies and institutions to which new initiatives can appeal for support and
assistance.
We have seen how these various kinds of fragmentation create conditions fa-
vorable to the formation and flourishing of religious groups. Interestingly, similar
considerations may help to explain the strength of American universities. In their
marvelous book on American higher education, Christopher Jencks and David
Reisman observed that whereas "Britain has not allowed independent entrepre-
neurs, either public or private, to establish new colleges and universities... in
America ... central authority has been weaker and more distrusted."'25 Educa-
tional innovators in the United States consequently had options not enjoyed by
their British counterparts. Thus, "the dissidents who disliked Harvard, Yale, or
William and Mary did not in most cases try to transform them, as English dissi-
dents did Oxford and Cambridge during the same era. Instead, they set up their
own competitive colleges to serve new purposes, many of which had not previ-
ously been regarded as appropriate for a college."' 126 Moreover "since colonial
times states and cities have been unhappy about depending on colleges located be-
yond their physical and cultural boundaries," and as a result "[a]ll states and many
cities have therefore set up their own institutions 'responsive to local condi-
tions.""2 7 According to Jencks and Reisman, "nobody even considered the possi-
bility that several states should be required to collaborate in establishing land-
grant colleges."' 2 Not only the fragmentation of American government into mul-
tiple units, but also the diversity of American society, spurred the proliferation of
colleges: "Nineteenth-century Americans grouped themselves by occupation, so-
cial class, religion, sex, locality, and ethnic background," and "almost all these
groups felt impelled to set up their own colleges, both to perpetuate their distinc-
tive sub-culture and to give it legitimacy in the larger society."'
' 29
Ironically, then, churches and universities, which sometimes regard one an-
other as rivals, may owe their vigor to similar sources. We should not exaggerate
the point, of course. Infusions of federal money accelerated the trend toward
professionalization of university faculties. 3 ' In higher education, unlike in
125. JENCKS & RIESMAN,supra note 11, at 105.
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American religion, old institutions dominate, and new entrants face huge hand-
icaps. New colleges and universities do form, but they cannot easily compete
with their well-established predecessors."'
None of this, though, is inconsistent with the idea that fragmentation of
American authority (both social and political) has been as crucial to higher edu-
cation as to religion. Indeed, the higher education example makes clear that
fragmentation is an idea much different from "deregulation" or "the night
watchman state." Fragmentation is quite consistent with the idea of government
intervention-although it entails that intervention is likely to come from mul-
tiple, competing governmental bodies, and that this uncoordinated intervention
will rarely be capable of dominating any sphere of associative activity. Thus, for
example, states (and even localities) have competed with one another to produce
the best universities, and federal funding for research has piggy-backed on com-
petition among both public and private faculties.
Nor are the religious and collegiate domains unique. For example, Russell
Hardin has suggested that the weakness of national policymaking institutions en-
abled economic markets to thrive (because they were insulated against the desta-
bilizing effects of policy shifts), 3 2 and I have elsewhere argued that the
fragmentation of state and national government in the United States leaves local
institutions with more autonomy than they would otherwise have.'33 The same
structural features of American government which cripple efforts to devise and
implement national policies (about, for example, health care) are uniquely hospi-
table to the associational activity-religious, collegiate, economic, and political-
for which America is known. It is an open question whether that trade-off is a
desirable one-but surely its advantages and disadvantages ought to be better
understood.
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